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3Introduction and  
Key Findings
It is relatively easy to identify tens of thousands of social 
media users who have an interest in violent ideologies, but 
very difficult to figure out which users are worth watching. 
For students of extremist movements and those working to 
counter violent extremism online, deciphering the signal amid 
the noise can prove incredibly daunting. 
This paper sets out a first step in solving that problem. We 
have devised a scoring system to find out which social 
media accounts within a specific extremist circle were most 
influential and most prone to be influenced (a tendency we 
called exposure). 
Our starting data centered on followers of 12 American white 
nationalist/white supremacist “seed” accounts on Twitter. We 
discovered that by limiting our analysis to interactions with 
this set, the metrics also identified the users who were highly 
engaged with extremist ideology. 
Within our total dataset of 3,542 users, only 44 percent 
overtly identified themselves as white nationalists online. By 
measuring interactions alone—without analyzing user content 
related to the ideology—we narrowed the starting set down 
to 100 top-scoring accounts, of which 95 percent overtly self-
identified as white nationalist. Among the top 200, 83 percent 
self-identified, and for the top 400, the self-identification rate 
was 74 percent. A comparison analysis run on followers of 
anarchist Twitter accounts suggests the methodology can be 
used without modification on any number of ideologies.
Because this approach is entirely new (at least in the 
public sphere), the paper spends some time discussing the 
methodology and findings in some detail, before concluding 
with a series of recommendations for countering violent 
extremism (CVE) based on the findings. The key terms for 
understanding the recommendations are:
4•	 Influence: The tendency of a user to inspire a 
measurable reaction from other users (such as a replies 
or retweets). 
•	 Exposure: The flip side of influence, this is the  
tendency of a user to respond to another user in a 
measurable way. 
•	 Interactivity: The sum of influence and exposure scores, 
roughly representing how often a user interacts with the 
content of other users. 
Our key findings include:
•	 Influence is highly concentrated among the top 1 percent 
of users in the set. 
•	 High scores in both influence and exposure showed a 
strong correlation to engagement with the seed ideology 
(white nationalism in our primary analysis, and anarchism 
in a secondary analysis). 
•	 Interactivity, the sum of influence and exposure scores, 
was even more accurate at identifying users highly 
engaged with the seed ideology. 
In the course of collecting the data needed to measure 
influence and exposure, we incidentally collected a large 
amount of data on hashtags and links used by people who 
follow known white nationalists on Twitter. When we examined 
this data, we discovered that members of the dataset were 
highly engaged with partisan Republican and mainstream 
conservative politics. The paper presents a significant amount 
of context needed to properly evaluate this finding. 
Working from these findings, the paper makes several 
recommendations for new CVE initiatives with a focus 
on NGO efforts, which was the purpose of this research, 
although we recognize our findings will likely have utility  
for government efforts in this sphere as well.  
Our recommendations include:
5•	 We believe these metrics offer ways to concretely 
measure which types of CVE approaches are effective 
and which are not, bringing some clarity to a realm where 
strategies are often wishful and based on assumptions, 
while conclusions are often anecdotal and inconclusive. 
•	 The concentration of influence among a very few users 
suggests that disruptive approaches and counter-
messaging should be targeted to the top of the food 
chain, rather than working with the larger base of users. 
•	 Our analysis found that the seed accounts—all well-
known white nationalist ideologues and activists—were 
not necessarily producing the most popular content and 
links to external Web sites. The collected data can be 
used to find the most important external content sources, 
and target them for disruption through terms-of-service 
violation reporting, or through counter-messaging.
•	 By tracking these metrics on an ongoing basis, NGO 
efforts to counterprogram against extremist narratives 
can be evaluated to measure how many users adopt 
or respond to counter-messaging content, and how 
much influence accrues to different kinds of positive 
messaging.
•	 Since the data suggests white nationalists are actively 
seeking dialogue with conservatives, CVE activists should 
enlist the help of mainstream conservatives, who may be 
considerably more successful than NGOs at engaging 
extremists with positive messaging. Further research may 
also suggest avenues for engagement between other 
kinds of extremists and other mainstream political and 
religious movements.
Finally, we believe that these metrics are only a starting point 
for the study of extremist use of social media. We believe the 
metrics and approaches here can be further refined, and we 
believe that additional research may yield substantial new 
techniques for monitoring and countering the promotion of 
violent ideologies online. 
6
7Overview
As social media grows more important to organizational 
activity of all types, its role in enabling radicalization and 
extremism has come under intense scrutiny. This paper 
examines one type of extremism, white nationalism, on one 
social network, Twitter,1 in order to learn more about the 
nature of social media interactions.
We used a numerical scoring system to analyze the number 
and type of interactions among 3,542 Twitter users who 
followed the accounts of well-known white nationalists. 
Not all members of the overall dataset were committed white 
nationalists, but we found that 95 of the 100 users with the 
highest scores for interactivity were also observed to be highly 
engaged with white nationalist (WN) ideology in their tweets 
and how they described themselves in their Twitter account 
profiles. For the top 200, the metric’s accuracy in identifying 
users overtly engaged with WN ideology was 83 percent, and 
for the top 400 the accuracy rate was 74 percent. 
Importantly, the scoring system did not include analysis of 
any terms or conditions specific to white nationalism, defined 
here as any ideology that prioritizes white racial identity as a 
fundamental component of how society should be organized. 
Instead, results were derived solely by measuring interactions 
within the dataset, regardless of content, which suggests 
the approach can be applied without modification to other 
extremist ideologies. To test that theory, we replicated the 
analysis of the initial dataset on a group of Twitter users who 
followed anarchist accounts, with encouraging but more 
ambiguous results. 
As one component of the scoring system, we analyzed the 
dataset to identify the most influential users. We found that 
nearly 50 percent of all influence in the system (as defined by 
1 A glossary of Twitter terms is included as Appendix F. For more explanation of 
how Twitter works see https://support.twitter.com/articles/215585-twitter-101-
how-should-i-get-started-using-twitter 
8a weighted measurement of interaction described below)  
was concentrated among the top 1.5 percent of users. 
We believe these results offer significant opportunities to 
improve initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism 
(CVE) in the online arena, including improved selection  
of targets for counter-messaging and disruptive tactics  
and the ability to quantitatively measure the success of  
different approaches. 
In a secondary analysis, we also examined links and  
hashtags tweeted by users in the dataset and found a 
significant portion of the content related to mainstream 
conservative and partisan Republican politics. This finding 
requires a significant amount of context to be interpreted 
fairly, and it is important to reiterate that not all users in 
the dataset were committed to white nationalism. Most 
importantly, the timing of the data collection, during the 
political convention season with a major election  
approaching, should also be taken into consideration as  
it likely influenced the choice of both links and hashtags,  
as discussed in greater detail below. 
With a full consideration of the context, we believe this  
finding suggests that social conservatives are in a very  
strong position to conduct effective CVE programs aimed  
at neutralizing the messages and narratives promulgated  
by influential white nationalists. 
Our comparison analysis of followers of anarchist  
Twitter accounts found that while those users posted a  
large amount of material pertaining to liberal views, they 
posted much less content related to mainstream and  
partisan politics.
9Methodology and terms
Methodology
•	 A short glossary of Twitter-specific terms used herein is 
attached as Appendix F.
•	 Sampled Twitter accounts: 12 “seed” Twitter 
accounts for users identified as prominent individuals or 
organizations within the white nationalist movement
•	 Followers dataset: 3,542 Twitter accounts that follow 
one or more seed accounts
•	 Total dataset: The 200 most recent tweets for each seed 
and follower, or all available tweets if the account had less 
than 200. Total tweets analyzed: 342,807. 
•	 Sample period: Automated collection was completed  
25 August 2012. Manual inspection of accounts began  
25 August 2012 and continued through 31 October 2012. 
•	 Metrics: A complete explanation of all metrics may be 
found in Appendix B. 
Key Terms
•	 White nationalist: Any ideology that prioritizes white 
racial identity as a fundamental component of how a  
given society or nation should be organized. 
•	 Influence: A metric measuring a Twitter user’s ability to 
publicly create and distribute content that is consumed, 
affirmed and redistributed by other users. 
•	 Exposure: A metric measuring a Twitter user’s tendency  
to publicly consume, affirm and redistribute content 
created by other users. 
•	 Interactivity: A metric measuring a Twitter user’s 
combined influence and exposure based on their  
public activity. 
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Collected Data
Collection began with 12 Twitter accounts belonging to 
prominent individuals and organizations that openly and 
unambiguously promote organized, ideological white 
nationalism, including the official accounts of David Duke, the 
Aryan Nations and the White Aryan Resistance. A full list is 
found in Appendix A. 
These “seed” accounts were chosen based on the current 
and historical significance of the people and organizations to 
white nationalist ideology, as well as for their unambiguous 
status as white nationalists. We collected information that 
the followers of the seed accounts made publicly available 
between August and October 2012, using a Web application 
designed by co-author Bill Strathearn. 
No one of the 12 seed accounts attracted a notably large 
number of followers. All 12 accounts together had 3,542 
followers with publicly viewable profiles, many of whom 
followed more than one seed. For each of the 12 seeds 
and their 3,542 followers, we collected the 200 most recent 
tweets. In some cases, accounts had not yet posted 200 
tweets, in which case all available tweets were collected. A 
total of 342,807 tweets were analyzed statistically. Tens of 
thousands of tweets were also manually reviewed. 
Not all the follower accounts collected belonged to users 
who openly embraced or supported white nationalist views. 
A manual inspection of 350 randomly selected accounts 
from the follower dataset showed 44 percent were overtly 
engaged with white nationalism in observed tweets or by 
self-identification in their user profile (margin of error + /- 5.4 
percent). The sample was selected using a random number 
function to assign a random number value to each user.  
The dataset was then sorted according to the random  
value, and the first 350 accounts were analyzed. 
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Sixteen percent of the dataset unambiguously self-identified 
with white nationalism in their profiles or usernames by using 
clear terms and phrases to describe themselves, such as 
Aryan, racist, racialist or white nationalist. We took such 
primary self-identification to indicate a very high level of 
engagement with WN ideology. 
Close to 50 percent of the random sample of followers 
of seed accounts displayed no overt sign of positive 
engagement with white nationalism in their tweets or profiles 
other than the act of following a seed account. The vast 
majority of these simply provided no clear evidence of their 
attitudes toward white nationalism, either for or against. 
A tiny handful overtly expressed views incompatible with 
white nationalism, such as belief in racial harmony or non-
discrimination. Only one account was observed to be an 
activist opposed to white nationalism. 
44% 
36% 
6% 
64% 50% 
Overtly engaged 
with white 
nationalism 
No overt white 
nationalism 
Random Sample
N = 350
Overtly Engaged
N = 154
Tweets Only 
Self-description 
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Twelve percent of the random sample followed more than 
500 other accounts. We judged these individuals to be 
indiscriminately following others, often in hopes of gaining 
more followers themselves (a common Twitter strategy). 
Twenty-two percent of the indiscriminate followers were 
overtly engaged with WN ideology on Twitter, about half the 
rate of the overall set, while 70 percent showed no overt 
engagement. 
All of the seed accounts were based in the United States. 
Followers came from a number of locations. Because Twitter’s 
profile parameters are unstructured, we could not statistically 
analyze the locations, but users were anecdotally observed 
to live primarily in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden and Canada. Users were observed from elsewhere in 
Europe, including France and Germany, Latin America, Asia 
and the Middle East. 
Only public information was factored into this analysis. No 
data was collected on accounts marked as private at the time 
of collection. The status of some accounts changed between 
the start of collection and the end of analysis, including a 
handful of voluntary and involuntary suspensions, and some 
accounts which switched from public to private. 
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Analysis of Influence
We designed a scoring system to measure the “influence”  
and “exposure” of the seed accounts and their followers  
using their patterns of interaction with other users in the 
followers dataset. Interactions with the seeds and users 
outside the dataset of followers are not scored in the  
metrics presented here. 
Influence and exposure are defined as Twitter interactions 
that mirror the real life definitions of the terms – influence 
defined as the ability to spread and promote content or ideas, 
and exposure as a tendency to consume content or ideas 
generated by others. 
In terms of Twitter activity specifically, influence was defined 
as when a user did something that inspired a reaction from a 
second user (such as prompting the second user to reply to a 
tweet, or to retweet content initially tweeted by the first user). 
In the context of this paper, a user’s influence score may be 
said to determine how “influential” that user is. 
Exposure was simply the other side of the coin, defined 
as when a user performed such an action in response to 
another user. A user who retweeted a second user, or replied 
to something the second user tweeted, received points for 
exposure. Throughout the paper, a user’s exposure score may 
be said to determine how “exposed” that user is to content 
generated by other users within the dataset. For instance, 
that a user with a high exposure score may be designated as 
“more exposed” than one with a low score. 
Although influence and exposure represent opposite types of 
interactions, an account could have high or low scores in one 
or both categories, depending on the nature and quantity of 
its interactions. The complete scoring formula, with examples, 
is attached as Appendix B.
Interactions were weighted to emphasize keywords in tweets 
indicating they might be linked to more significant types of 
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communication such as “call,” “email” or “DM” (referring to 
Twitter’s direct messaging system for private communications 
between users). 
After analysis of these initial results, we created a third score, 
which was simply the sum of the influence and exposure 
scores, a measurement we refer to as “total interactivity,” 
representing the overall quantity of meaningful interactions 
conducted by the account holder.  
Importantly, the scoring system did not consider or score 
terms relevant to white nationalism. Our initial goal was 
simply to analyze the social network structure to evaluate 
which followers of seed accounts were extremely influential 
or extremely vulnerable to influence. The scoring system’s 
effectiveness at identifying people overtly engaged with  
the ideology that united the seed accounts was an 
unexpected finding. 
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Identification of Engaged 
Extremists
The rankings discussed throughout this paper apply to 
the followers of the seed accounts and exclude the seeds 
themselves, as our goal was to evaluate the less obvious 
participants in the network. Within the follower dataset, the 
number one most-influential account, by a wide margin, had 
been identified as a potentially important user in the dataset 
through a manual examination of the seeds and their followers 
prior to data collection, suggesting that the scoring system’s 
results were not out of line with manual analysis. Manual 
inspection of the most influential and exposed accounts found 
that the ranked accounts generally conformed to the qualities 
we sought to identify (i.e., influence and exposure). 
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Among top 100 most influential, 86 percent were observed to 
be overtly engaged with white nationalism beyond the simple 
act of following a seed account (as previously defined in the 
dataset section, “overtly engaged” means users self-identified 
as white nationalists or tweeted consistently about white 
nationalism in a non-adversarial light). For the top 200, the 
percentages dropped to 73.5 percent. Ninety-three of the 
100 most exposed accounts were overtly engaged with white 
nationalism. Of the top 200, 83 percent were overtly engaged. 
After examining these results in detail and observing their 
unanticipated utility at identifying engaged extremists, we 
posed the question of whether it was possible to improve the 
identification process. We experimented with variations on the 
original scores and found that adding influence and exposure, 
creating a measurement of overall “interactivity,” produced 
improved identifications. 
Manual examination showed 95 of the 100 accounts with 
the highest interactivity scores were overtly engaged with 
TOP 100 
MOST INTERACTIVE 
USERS
5%
24%
71%
Overtly engaged in tweets only
Self-identified as white nationalist
Not overtly engaged
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white nationalism, and 71 self-identified as white nationalist 
in their usernames or profiles, showing extremely high levels 
of engagement. This compared very favorably to the random 
sample, where 44 percent were overtly engaged and 16 
percent self-identified. 
For users with the top 200 interactivity scores, 83 percent 
were overtly engaged and 57.5 percent self-identified. Of the 
top 400, 74 percent were overtly engaged. 
There was substantial overlap among the highest-scoring 
accounts in each category, with a number of accounts 
scoring high in all three measurements. 
Within the top 50 of all three categories, only one account 
appeared totally irrelevant, a person who generically 
interacted with accounts that began following him. Another 
user self-identified using neo-Nazi terminology and interacted 
with engaged white nationalists, but did not herself 
obsessively tweet on the subject. 
The remaining top-50 users were observed to be highly 
engaged with white nationalism and spent the vast majority  
of their time on Twitter discussing WN ideology. 
Based on these findings, we believe the scoring formula may 
have a number of useful applications in CVE efforts, which  
will be discussed below. 
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Content of Tweets
Although we set out with the primary goal of analyzing the 
network interactions of the followers of white nationalist 
seed accounts, the nature of our process also resulted in the 
collection of other data, including links to external content and 
hashtags (self-conscious content identifiers) used in tweets 
by members of the dataset. A casual examination of this 
collected data produced unexpected insights into the content 
being promoted and consumed by the followers dataset, and 
so we carried out a more detailed analysis. 
Links
We detected 676 distinct domains in a total of 84,825 tweets 
that included links from the seed accounts and their followers. 
2%
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domain names
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We classified the links into four major categories: mainstream 
news, alternative sources, extremist sources, and content-
neutral. Sites that generally adhered to journalistic standards 
were classified as mainstream news, even if they had a 
political slant, such as Fox News. 
The alternative category included sites that explicitly 
articulated a political slant and sites that did not consistently 
conform to mainstream journalistic standards. 
Extremist sources consisted of sites that openly advocated 
white nationalism or very closely related themes. 
The content-neutral category included links where the 
specific content could not be resolved, as well as sports, 
entertainment, health and science news sources deemed  
of minimal interest to the study.
Mainstream news accounted for 12 percent of all links; 
alternative and extremist sources combined represented 
another 15 percent. 
The categorization process necessarily involved a number 
of subjective judgments. For instance, a handful of sites 
included in the extremist category did not explicitly endorse 
white nationalism, but provided narrative support to themes 
white nationalists consider to be crucial. The most important 
of these, in terms of the number of links tweeted by users in 
the dataset, was Infowars.com, a conspiracy-oriented Web 
site. Other subjective calls included the classification of state-
sponsored media and foreign nationalist sites. Overall, we 
estimate around 6 to 8 percent of these subjective judgments 
could be considered open for debate. 
The single most-linked domain by an overwhelming margin 
was YouTube, which accounted for about 21 percent of 
all links detected. The content-neutral category included 
a number of other service providers, such as Blogger and 
Wordpress, where the nature of the content could not be 
determined. Finally, generic URLs generated by various 
popular Twitter clients represented 15.9 percent of all links. 
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We suspect many of these links would be classified as 
alternative or extremist content, to an extent that could 
substantially shift the percentages given above. 
Top Sites
The top 10 sites linked in each category were: 
Extremist Alternative Mainstream Content-neutral
whiteresister.com rt.com dailymail.co.uk youtube.com
cofcc.org examiner.com foxnews.com bit.ly
realisten.se theblaze.com bbc.co.uk facebook.com
infowars.com wnd.com nytimes.com youtu.be
vnnforum.com breitbart.com guardian.co.uk blogspot.com
amren.com presstv.ir huffingtonpost.com twitter.com
northwestfront.org dailycaller.com telegraph.co.uk tumblr.com
malevolentfreedom.org hotair.com thehill.com wordpress.com
thenewamerican.com globalresearch.ca cnn.com fb.me
vdare.com thegatewaypundit.com reuters.com instagram.com
Top 10 as a percentage of all links
46.3 46.8 36.1 58.5
Mainstream conservative information sources were found 
throughout the links, mostly in the alternative category, which 
by definition included political content. 
The top 10 alternative URLs accounted for nearly half of 
all links in the alternative category. Among the top 10, 54 
percent of links went to sources espousing clear partisan 
Republican viewpoints (as opposed to simply expressing 
conservative views). 
The number of links per site dropped sharply in the lower 
rankings. Many sites in the lower 112 URLs were oriented 
so ambiguously among mainstream conservative, fringe 
conservative and libertarian views as to defeat easy 
classification.
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Among the top 10 mainstream news sites, 31 percent of 
links went to the top two sources, the Daily Mail (UK) and 
Fox News (US), both of which are strongly oriented toward 
mainstream political conservatism. The remainder went to 
a mix of top mainstream news sources, including sites that 
were reasonably considered apolitical, such as the New  
York Times, or had a liberal orientation, such as the 
Huffington Post. 
The most-linked extremist site was WhiteResister.com,  
but more than half the links to that site originated with two 
Twitter accounts, both affiliated with the site. Discounting  
links from those two accounts, WhiteResister.com would  
have dropped to sixth. 
Significantly, the accounts promoting WhiteResister.com 
were the two most followed by other users in the dataset, 
pointing to influence above and beyond the bias introduced 
by their self-promotional tweets (or at least highlighting the 
effectiveness of self-promotion at garnering links). 
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The top 10 list also illustrates an important point. While  
the followers of white nationalist Twitter accounts are clearly 
engaged with the ideology, that doesn’t mean they are 
involved in promoting the seed accounts of leading WN 
figures and organizations. 
Of the top 10 most-linked extremist sites, only two – amren.
com and northwestfront.org – were associated with seed 
accounts. Our influence rankings excluded the seed 
accounts. If they had been included in the dataset, three of 
the seed accounts would have ranked among the top 10 
most influential. But the Web sites associated with those three 
accounts did not appear among the 100 sites most-linked by 
the followers dataset. 
This demonstrates that followers were far more likely to 
promote their own related agendas than to promote well-
known leaders and groups and suggests that these well-
known leaders of white nationalism in the United States may 
be losing touch with their constituents. While they still carry 
significant weight in the movement, they are not generating 
daily buzz, on Twitter at least. 
Connecting the most influential Twitter users with online 
content hosted elsewhere also expands the universe of 
options for CVE practitioners, which will be discussed in  
more detail in the CVE Implications section of this paper. 
Hashtags
Hashtags included in tweets by the seed accounts and 
their followers pointed more clearly to engagement with 
mainstream politics. The top 10 hashtags used by the seeds 
and followers combined were: 
1. tcot (top conservatives on Twitter)
2. svpol (Swedish police)
3. teaparty
4. p2 (used to address comments to progressives)
5. gop
6. tlot (top libertarians on Twitter)
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7. ff (used to recommend Twitter accounts  
to  
other followers)
8. Obama 
9. news
10. ows (Occupy Wall Street) 
Given that not all accounts overtly engaged with white 
nationalism, we analyzed the top 10 hashtags tweeted by the 
200 and 50 most influential followers of seed accounts, who 
were more highly engaged with white nationalism. 
For hashtags, narrowing the dataset down to the most 
influential and extreme users surfaced specific tags relating 
to extremism, including #wpww (White Power World Wide), 
#nwo (New World Order) and #edl (English Defense League). 
However, the mainstream political tags remained significant 
and in many cases represented a higher percentage as the 
user base became more extreme. The tags #tcot, #gop and 
#teaparty remained in the top 10, in the same order as they 
appeared for the whole dataset. #tcot was the most-used 
hashtag in all subsets examined. 
All followers 200 most 
influential
50 most 
influential
TCOT 10% TCOT 18% TCOT 20%
SVPOL 3% SVPOL 11% SVPOL 18%
TEAPARTY 3% TEAPARTY 6% WPWW 14%
P2 3% GOP 5% EDL 11%
GOP 2% P2 5% TEAPARTY 8%
TLOT 2% WPWW 4% FF 6%
FF 2% TLOT 4% GOP 5%
OBAMA 1% OCRA 3% OBAMA 5%
NEWS 1% NATPOL 3% NWO 4%
OWS 1% NOW 3% P2 3%
TOP 10 HASHTAGS, PERCENTAGE OF ALL TAGS 
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Political Context Considerations
In our random sample, 16 percent of users self-identified 
as white nationalists, but only 4 percent self-identified as 
mainstream conservatives. That suggests the link and 
hashtag results are driven more by white nationalists feeling 
an affinity for conservatism than by conservatives feeling an 
affinity for white nationalism. 
The timing of the data collection, during the political 
convention season with a major election approaching, likely 
influenced the choice of both links and hashtags. President 
Obama’s race almost certainly motivated white nationalists to 
take an enhanced interest in mainstream Republican politics. 
A number of the 10 hashtags most often tweeted by the 
follower dataset (including those most oriented toward 
Republicans) were recommended for use in an organized 
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program of tweets by a social media group outside the 
dataset with a stated intention to “discredit the Obama 
campaign.” This effort began no later than August and may 
have tilted the results.2 
Many of the same tags were recommended on a non-racial 
militia movement Web site in September 2012 as a way to 
broadcast that movement’s message to those in the political 
mainstream.3
This tactic could also have been adopted by white 
nationalists, although explicit evidence of such an effort was 
not found. These online campaigns were found by searching 
for several of the hashtags together in a database of extremist 
Web sites routinely maintained by co-author J.M. Berger. 
Finally, it is important to note that engagement does not 
necessarily mean positive or two-way engagement. For 
instance, the ranking of #p2 and #ows among the top 
10 suggests the mere presence of a hashtag does not 
necessarily represent an endorsement. 
In light of these factors, we recommend revisiting this 
research after the election and caution against drawing 
overbroad conclusions about the relationship between 
mainstream conservative politics and white nationalism. 
Despite all this, we believe these results are neither invalid 
nor insignificant. The context and timing may have inflated 
numbers regarding mainstream political engagement, but  
the social network’s involvement in electoral politics is  
itself interesting and significant. 
Additional research over time may help illuminate the  
strength and persistence of these patterns, but we suspect  
it would not erase them. We discuss the implications of  
these findings further in the CVE recommendations below.
2 https://www.facebook.com/groups/TwitterAttack/, retrieved October 2012 
3 “HASHTAGS # for Waging Political Warfare: Use these tags if you’re using 
twitter” posted on a militia Web site monitored by Intelwire.com on September 
15, 2012 
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Comparison Group
After reviewing the first set of results, we performed 
supplemental data collection in October using a seed group 
of eight well-known and overtly anarchist Twitter accounts in 
order to further test the scoring system and try to capture a 
better picture of how mainstream political discourse relates  
to extremist movements aside from white nationalism. 
Anarchism is by definition less leadership-oriented, which may 
skew comparisons in various ways. It is also, by its nature, 
less clearly defined, making the categorization of accounts 
more difficult. For instance, the Occupy movement has 
strong anarchistic components, but Occupy is not generally 
considered anarchist by definition. 
We collected from fewer accounts than we did WNs, but the 
eight anarchist seeds had more followers than the 12 white 
national accounts (5,409 versus 3,542). In part, this likely 
reflects the lesser social stigma associated with anarchism 
compared to white nationalism, as well as an anecdotally 
observed tendency of anarchists to be younger and more 
technologically proficient than white nationalists. 
Based on anecdotal observation, we would also argue it is 
easier to be casually involved with anarchism than it is to be 
casually involved with ideological white nationalism. Users 
who self-identified with a variation of the word anarchist often 
included several other interests in their self-identification. 
Users who self-identified as white nationalist were much more 
prone to identify solely with that ideology. 
For all of these reasons, we believe that anarchism likely 
represents the most difficult ideological extremism challenge 
for metrics-based identification. 
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Identification Rate
Of the 100 followers of anarchist seeds with the highest 
interactivity scores, 70 percent overtly engaged on 
Twitter with anarchism; engaged with very closely related 
movements, including the Black Bloc segment of the Occupy 
movement and Anonymous; or self-described as radical or 
revolutionary. 
Another 20 percent overtly engaged in tweets with Occupy 
but not Black Bloc, or overtly engaged with strongly anti-
government leftist movements, making their presence clearly 
relevant, while not precisely matching the definition of the 
seeds. Depending on how you classify that 20 percent, the 
identification rate falls between 70 and 90 percent for the top 
100, compared to 95 percent for white nationalists.
Fifty-eight of the top 100 accounts self-identified as anarchist, 
Black Bloc, Anonymous or something clearly within the same 
ideological space. Another 18 self-identified with Occupy, 
communism or socialism, but did not self-identify  
as anarchist. 
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This self-identification rate of 58 percent to 76 percent 
(depending how tightly one defines the target category) 
compared to a self-identification rate of 71 percent for the  
top 100 most interactive members of the white nationalist 
follower dataset.
Given that anarchism is extremely diverse and resistant to 
consistent labeling and movement cohesion, and given the 
lower threshold for casual involvement, we believe these 
results are extremely encouraging, especially given that only 
about 10 percent of the entire dataset self-identified with a 
variation of the word “anarchist.” 
In light of these findings, we believe the scoring system can 
be effective at identifying followers who are highly engaged 
in ideological extremism in social networks revolving around 
seed accounts with a clear ideological orientation, regardless 
of what specific ideology is being examined.
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Links and hashtags used by the anarchist seed accounts  
and their followers somewhat predictably skewed to the 
left side of the political spectrum. However, they tweeted 
considerably less content related to partisan politics than  
WN seeds and followers. 
In addition to being a larger dataset, the anarchist followers 
were also prolific tweeters. We analyzed 188,573 links 
(the top 85 percent of the 220,214 collected) and found 
that followers of anarchist seeds relied somewhat more 
on mainstream news than white nationalists (15 percent 
compared to 13 percent), while relying much less on clearly 
extremist sites (3 percent versus 8 percent). The number 
of content neutral links was the same, 73 percent, with the 
remaining links going to alternative sources. 
Categorizations were even more subjective for this dataset 
than for the original. For instance, it was difficult to determine 
whether Occupy, Wikileaks, Anonymous and hacker sites 
should be considered as extremist sites relevant to the seed 
ideology. 
For purposes of the analysis above, all of these were counted 
as “extremist.” If they were discounted, extremist sites would 
have represented only 1.4 percent of the total mix, far less 
than the 7 percent tweeted by the white nationalist dataset. 
Alternative sites were overwhelmingly liberal in their 
orientation, although debatably less partisan. For instance, 
Democracy Now, Mother Jones and Salon were among the 
top 10 alternative sites, but the latter two especially have 
frequently and sharply criticized the Obama administration  
on topics such as law enforcement, surveillance, foreign 
policy and the use of drones. 
The hashtags offer a better window for comparing the  
political proclivities of followers of white nationalist seeds 
versus followers of anarchist seeds. The top 10 hashtags 
used in the anarchist dataset were:
1. ows (Occupy Wall Street)
2. occupy
3. oo (Occupy Oakland)
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4. occupydenver 
5. anonymous
6. p2 (used to engaged with progressives) 
7. ff (Follow Friday) 
8. s17 (September 17, the anniversary of the founding  
of Occupy Wall Street)
9. occupywallstreet 
10. occupyoakland
Compared to the top 10 hashtags used by white nationalists, 
these tags suggest a much higher disenfranchisement from 
mainstream politics. Again, this may relate to the basic nature 
of anarchism, which is fundamentally opposed to political 
institutions, compared to white nationalism, which is not 
opposed to institutions per se. 
Overall, we interpreted these results to indicate anarchists, 
while clearly embracing many liberal values, were far less 
engaged with partisan liberal politics than white nationalists 
with partisan conservative politics. 
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CVE Implications and 
Recommendations
The first challenge in conducting any type of Countering 
Violent Extremism (CVE) program is finding the target 
audience. Given the ease of access to extremism online and 
the allure of large numbers, many CVE efforts have focused 
on social media as a hunting ground for extremists.But while 
it is relatively simple to collect large datasets of potential 
extremists online, it is much more challenging to identify 
people who are sufficiently engaged to be suitable targets 
for CVE. Online activity often involves a lot of bad behavior 
and indiscriminate sampling of ideas. Shielded by physical 
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distance and anonymity, people often express views online 
that they would rarely, if ever, express in their offline lives. 
In short, the vast majority of people taking part in extremist 
talk online are unimportant. They are casually involved, 
dabbling in extremism, and their rhetoric has a relatively 
minimal relationship to the spread of pernicious ideologies 
and their eventual metastasization into real-world violence. 
Any CVE program must begin by sifting the wheat from  
this chaff. 
While this study is not an end-state solution to the sorting 
problem, we believe it represents a significant step forward. 
As shown in the graph above, a higher interactivity score 
clearly corresponded to a higher probability that a user was 
overtly engaged with the ideology espoused by the seed 
accounts. Ranked by the interactivity metric, we found that 
95 of the 100 highest-scoring members of the followers 
dataset were highly engaged with white nationalist ideology. 
These results are not a substitute for manual examination of 
user activity, but they provide a way to take a snapshot of a 
large user base and almost instantly prioritize the dataset, 
isolating fruitful avenues of investigation. For instance, a 
manual examination of the followers of seed white nationalist 
accounts took several days and identified only two or three 
follower accounts that subjectively appeared to be very 
influential. The metrics identified the same accounts and 
many more while requiring much less direct investment of 
time and effort by a human analyst. 
CVE initiatives are not limited to one type of extremism. 
They can cover diverse ideologies such as jihadism, white 
nationalism, black nationalism, anti-Muslim, sovereign citizen, 
anarchism, eco-terrorism and more. 
Based on the comparison results for anarchists, we believe 
this is an off-the-shelf approach that can be applied to any 
ideology without customization. However we do believe the 
metrics and analysis can be improved, perhaps substantially, 
with further research and testing. 
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We further believe that the paradigm of counting and 
weighting interactions can be adapted to any social network 
where an adequate amount of data can be scraped using 
automated tools. 
In addition to identification, we believe the scoring 
system applied in this study has several other quantitative 
applications to CVE programs. 
Measurement
CVE takes various forms. The most-discussed avenues 
involve persuasion (convincing potential extremists not to 
pursue violent ideologies) and disruption (preventing networks 
that promote radicalization from functioning effectively). 
These efforts can be conducted by government or by non-
governmental organizations. 
Critics of current CVE initiatives, including co-author J.M. 
Berger, have questioned the effectiveness of many CVE 
programs, pointing to the fact that there are no meaningful 
methods to measure success, especially as it pertains to 
persuasion programs. CVE strategies to date have been 
guided largely by intuition and anecdotal observation rather 
than by clearly relevant metrics.4 
The influence, exposure and interactivity scores showed 
remarkable success at identifying highly engaged white 
nationalists within the starting set. Manual inspection of 
the top-ranked accounts also suggests that the scores 
themselves can be interpreted as they were intended – as 
quantitative measures of engagement-related activity. 
Furthermore, the scores are not proportions or percentages; 
they measure the temperature of a given community, which 
means that a drop in score represents an absolute drop in  
the property (such as influence) being measured. So if the 
sum of all influence scores in the dataset drops, it suggests 
4 J.M. Berger, Intelwire.com, “Finding a Way Forward for CVE,” 19 August 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/09/monsters_and_children; Will 
McCants and Clint Watts, Foreign Policy Research Institute, “U.S. Strategy for 
Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment,” December 2012
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that the leaders of the dataset have become less influential.  
If interactivity scores drop, it suggests that engagement  
with the target ideology by members of the dataset has 
been reduced. 
Put simply, we believe the scoring system can be used to 
measure the absolute amount of engagement within a targeted 
online community in real time and over extended periods. 
This opens the door to quantitative testing of different CVE 
approaches. For instance, the scoring system can measure 
efforts to diminish the influence of key leaders, to inoculate 
a target audience against exposure, or simply to depress all 
interaction in the dataset.
Several CVE approaches are suggested by these conclusions. 
Targeting Influence  
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Influence was disproportionately distributed throughout users with a nonzero score, as  
shown above. More than 50 percent of all the influence in the system was attributed to just 
54 accounts, or 1.5 percent of the total number of accounts. The chart above shows the 
curve for all users with nonzero influence scores from highest to lowest.
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Our understanding of influence in the real world is fairly 
simple. A relative few individuals wield a tremendous amount 
of influence over much larger numbers of people. Our findings 
put some specificity on that intuitive concept. 
The vast majority of influence in the WN dataset was 
disproportionately concentrated at the top, as seen in the 
chart above. The top 50 most-influential users, looking this 
time at both followers and seeds – just 1.4 percent of the 
total – accounted for nearly 46 percent of all the influence in 
the system. (Because of their prominence, the seeds become 
more relevant when targeting accounts for CVE efforts.)
These findings generally conform to other studies of online 
activity, including the well-known 90-9-1 rule, which states 90 
percent of users in most online social networks are passive, 9 
percent are somewhat engaged and 1 percent drive most of 
the engagement and discussion.5 
We attempted to enhance measures of simple engagement 
by weighting interactions to emphasize users with greater 
reach and who provide content that is widely redistributed 
and deemphasize users whose engagement carried less 
weight in group dynamics. We expect the scoring system 
can be refined to improve these measurements further, but it 
performed very well out of the gate. 
The top 10 most influential accounts (less than 0.3 percent 
of all sampled users) accounted for 24.8 percent of the total 
influence in an ecosystem of 3,554 Twitter accounts (followers 
plus seeds) – a massively disproportionate distribution. This 
suggests the system is extremely vulnerable to disruption by 
focusing CVE efforts at the top of the food chain. 
Possible methods for disruption include submitting complaints 
over violations of terms of service, where applicable; 
challenging and discrediting influencers through investigative 
5 Jakob Nielsen, Nielsen Norman Group, “Participation Inequality: Encouraging 
More Users to Contribute,” 9 October 2006, http://www.useit.com/alertbox/
participation_inequality.html; Ben McConnell, The Church of the Customer 
Blog, “The 1% Rule: Charting citizen participation,” 3 May 2006, http://www.
churchofthecustomer.com/blog/2006/05/charting_wiki_p.html
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reporting and research; or challenging and discrediting 
influencers through open debate in the online sphere. 
Influence was disproportionately distributed even after 
removing the top 50 users. The chart above shows the curve 
for all remaining users with nonzero influence scores. 
 
After the top 50, a sharp curve remained even among the 
users who contributed the lower 50 percent of influence to 
the system. While this suggests there would be a diminishing 
benefit to removing influencers over time, the distribution 
remains top-heavy, with the second 50 (1.4 percent of the 
remaining sampled users) comprising slightly more than 27 
percent of the remaining influence. This suggests targeting 
the top of the curve can be effective even after the ecosystem 
has suffered significant attrition.6 
While it is impossible to know for certain without direct 
experimentation, we believe these curves suggest disruptive 
CVE aimed at the top can be very effective over the course of 
a long engagement. 
Another CVE option is to aim disruptive techniques at those 
with the highest exposure or interactivity scores. We originally 
suspected that high exposure scores might correlate to 
people at risk of radicalization who could be targeted for 
personalized interventions by nonprofit organizations. What 
we discovered instead was that users with high exposure 
scores were extremely committed to white nationalism and 
very active participants in the network. 
While interventions seem unlikely to be effective with such 
users, disruption might be effective. The distribution of both 
exposure and interactivity was less concentrated at the 
top than influence (with interactivity slightly outperforming 
exposure), but the distribution remained disproportionately 
top-heavy for both metrics. 
6 These calculations do not account for the redistribution of influence when 
users are removed from the system, with some of the remaining accounts 
becoming more prominent and thus more influential. Nor do they account for 
the reemergence of removed users under new Twitter handles. 
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Our evaluation of users with high exposure but medium to 
low influence is that they were mainly reactive, functioning 
as a supportive cheering section but not necessarily directly 
driving the content of discussions (which is not the same as 
saying their role in the system is insignificant). However, the 
interactivity metric was significantly more effective than any 
other method at identifying highly engaged users. Since users 
cannot be influential without other users who are exposed 
to them, we suspect that targeting the highest interactivity 
scores might have benefits that are not obvious but could 
become visible when scores are tracked over time. 
Finally, we should note that the influence distribution was 
different for anarchists than for white nationalists. The 
distribution of influence for the anarchists was much flatter, 
but still quite top heavy, with half the influence in the system 
residing among the top 106 accounts. This suggests the 
approach may need to be fine-tuned for different ideologies, 
but that the basic principles will remain effective. 
Targeting Content
Disruptive CVE approaches on Twitter are limited by broadly 
permissive Terms of Service. Social media platforms in 
general are biased towards freedom of speech, although it 
should be noted that freedom of speech is not synonymous 
with the freedom to use a specific company’s services. 
Providers of Internet publishing platforms are not obligated 
to host content in violation of their published rules, and they 
have wide latitude in deciding what those rules should be. 
Twitter’s TOS as of October 2012 banned “direct, specific 
threats of violence against others” and the use of Twitter to 
conduct or promote “illegal activities” and loosely defined 
“abusive behavior.” 
These terms are sufficiently ambiguous to allow designated 
global terrorist groups like Al Shabab to maintain active 
accounts on Twitter (although Shabab’s account was recently 
suspended for a direct threat of violence, it has since opened 
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a new account).7 The Taliban and many other extremists also 
use Twitter extensively. However several prominent extremist 
accounts have been suspended for unknown reasons as of 
December 2012. This may reflect a shift in policies, or it may 
be due to other unknown reasons. 
Regardless, disruption need not be limited to Twitter, thanks 
in part to the content analysis, which shows the most 
significant external sources of content. A large part of Twitter’s 
value as a social media tool involves the ability to provide links 
and steer users to more detailed material on other Web sites. 
For instance, YouTube emerged as the most-linked source of 
content in the dataset, representing more than 21 percent of 
all links and 49 percent of the top 10 links. Facebook, Blogger 
and Wordpress also ranked among the top 10 sources, even 
7 BBC News, “Somalia’s al-Shabab opens new Twitter account,” 4 Feburary 
2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21321687
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without accounting for sites that use those services under a 
custom domain. As noted previously, we could not determine 
the nature of the content being linked to under these 
domains, but it’s likely a significant percentage of these links 
point to user-generated content related to white nationalism. 
Terms of service vary for each of these online publishing 
platforms. YouTube has relatively robust tools for reporting 
and removing hate speech, including the ability to report 
users for “violent or repulsive,” and “hateful or abusive” 
content, with specific subcategories for promoting terrorism 
and violence and hatred. 
CVE practitioners can also make note of which subsets of a 
sampled dataset are linking to content, for instance targeting 
links provided by the most influential, exposed or interactive 
users, and report TOS violations, if any exist, with the  
content publisher. 
Intervening with At-Risk Individuals 
Manual inspection of the highest influence, exposure and 
interactivity scores found that almost all of the top 50 in each 
category were highly committed white nationalists unlikely to 
be swayed by intervention. 
The percentages dropped steadily and consistently as the 
view expanded to the top 100 and 200 accounts. We believe 
manually examining users whose interactivity rank falls 
between 200 and 500 might be fruitful in identifying people 
vulnerable to radicalization or in its early stages, whose 
interactions indicate an interest in an extremist ideology but 
not a single-minded obsession with it. 
Additional research is required to evaluate these findings 
in order to capture the characteristics of at-risk users 
and evaluate possible approaches to online intervention. 
Approaches can be field-tested and the scoring system 
can be used to help evaluate the results, although manual 
inspection and contextualization will likely be required. For 
instance, if an at-risk user is questioning the wisdom of 
pursuing white nationalism as a personal ideology, he or she 
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might temporarily become more interactive while seeking to 
test assumptions and challenge influencers. 
Since radicalization is a process, the rankings are only 
relevant to this dataset during the time period of collection,  
so scores should be recalculated prior to experimentation. 
Additional research might eventually point to ranges of 
influence, exposure and interactivity where the highest 
percentage of at-risk individuals can be found. Some 
adjustments to the scoring system would be necessary  
in order to support a universal range-based approach. 
CVE partners who undertake this research should keep 
detailed notes on the scores, ranks and profiles of individuals 
they approach and the results of their intervention in order to 
further refine the most effective target ranges. 
Countering Extremist Narratives
A popular approach to countering violent extremism involves 
creating and promoting narratives that oppose extremist 
ideologies, in the hopes of undermining existing extremist 
messages and competing for the hearts and minds of 
potential recruits. 
Although such efforts can be evaluated by how many 
participants they attract, their utility in actually countering 
extremism remains unclear. For instance, accumulating  
1,000 social media users who promote messages opposed to 
racism is an achievable goal, but it’s not clear how that effort 
lands in at-risk communities and whether people already 
attracted to white nationalism are positively influenced by 
such efforts or if they may even be further alienated by them. 
The metrics developed in this paper offer the possibility of 
performing quantitative evaluations for online messaging 
efforts. For instance, if the effort is centered around a Web 
site, CVE practitioners can track whether the links to the site 
are being tweeted by members of a targeted dataset, how the 
site is being characterized and whether influential users are 
discussing it. 
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If the effort is being promoted by specific Twitter accounts, 
those accounts can be introduced into the dataset and their 
influence can be tracked. Similarly, efforts to sway sentiment 
among specific subsets of users (or even individuals) can 
be tracked and scored to measure their success or failure 
in the online context. For instance, if the goal is to diminish 
the reach of the seed accounts, it is possible to track the 
influence of those accounts, whether users have exited the 
dataset by unfollowing them, and so forth. 
It should be noted that it is possible to game the system, so 
CVE practitioners must be coached on how to achieve honest 
results, although it is also possible that gaming the system 
could in some cases actually achieve the desired result. 
Further study and rigorous analysis of future outcomes will 
be required to evaluate how the scoring system can best be 
applied to such initiatives. 
Reactive Opportunities to Counter 
Extremist Narratives
The political content observed during data collection strongly 
suggests that white nationalist seed accounts, their Twitter 
followers and the most engaged subsets of their followers 
believe that mainstream political conservatives represent 
potential recruits, potential allies, or at minimum, persons  
with whom they share some interests. 
Regardless of exactly why, the data indisputably shows 
that during the collection period, people engaged with 
WN ideology consumed and distributed content related to 
mainstream political conservatism and tried to engage with 
mainstream conservatives. 
Many mainstream conservatives likely find these approaches 
offensive and choose to ignore them, but this outreach 
represents opportunities to intervene with people at various 
stages in the radicalization process. If someone reaches  
out to influence you, you gain an opportunity to influence  
them back. 
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Conservatives who are politically active online may 
therefore be better positioned than anyone to attempt CVE 
interventions with white nationalists. We strongly recommend 
that politically active conservatives consider ways they can 
spearhead or aggressively contribute to such CVE efforts by 
directly challenging white nationalists who attempt to get their 
attention through different styles of interaction online. 
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Data at a glance
Data collected
Seed accounts 12
Follower dataset 3,542
Tweets collected 342,807 
Total number of links 84,825
Distinct domains linked to 676 
Total number of hashtags 69,476
Unique hashtags 1,240
Identification rates by  
score based on random 
sample of 350 accounts 
(margin of error  
+/- 5.4 percent) 
% overtly engaged  
with WN as observed  
in manual inspection  
of accounts
All followers 44
Influence (Top 200) 73.5
Influence (Top 100) 86
Influence (Top 50) 98
Exposure (Top 200) 83
Exposure (Top 100) 93
Exposure (Top 50) 100
Interactivity (Top 200) 83
Interactivity (Top 100) 95
Interactivity (Top 50) 98
Link content by percentage
Mainstream news 12
Alternative 7
Extremist 8
Content neutral 73 15.9 (could not be 
determined)
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Appendices
A: Seed accounts 
The following seed accounts were manually identified for 
collection based on co-author J.M. Berger’s previous research 
on white nationalist movements. Each account was associated 
with a well-known ideological white nationalist organization or 
individual. The organizational affiliation for each account is  
given in parentheses. 
1. @HeimdallsGhost (White Aryan Resistance)
2. @American3rdP (American 3rd Position) 
3. @ANP14 (American Nazi Party)
4. @AryanNations (Aryan Nations, Morris Gullett branch)
5. @david_duke (David Duke)
6. @jartaylor (Jared Taylor, American Renaissance)
7. @TheNewNaziParty (American Nazi Party)
8. @nwfront (Northwest Front)
9. @UKANW (Northwest chapter of The United Klans of 
America)
10. @UKASOUTHFLA (Southern chapter of The United Klans 
of America)
11. @TheHoodedone88 (Affiliated with the United Klans) 
12. @NSFM_Commander (Edward McBride, National Socialist 
Freedom Movement)
The number of seed accounts was designed to be large 
enough to produce substantial amounts of data, but small 
enough to keep collection from becoming prohibitively time- 
and resource-consuming. 
B: Scoring formula and glossary 
of metrics
For each interaction, points were awarded for influence and 
exposure. For instance, if Account A retweeted a post by 
Account B, Account B received points for influencing Account 
A, while Account A received points for exposure to Account B. 
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If account C tweeted many links that were frequently 
retweeted, but never directly replied to or retweeted other 
users, Account C would accrue a high influence score but a 
low exposure score. If Account D sent replies to many users, 
but only a few responded, Account D would accrue a high 
exposure score, but a low influence score. 
If Account E often engaged in two-way conversations with 
other users, Account E would register high scores in both 
influence and exposure. 
Interactions were scored as follows: 
•	 at-replies: 10
•	 retweets (RT): 5
•	 hat-tip (HT): 20
•	 modified tweet (MT): 15
•	 non-reply mention: 2
•	 any of the above actions in a tweet with a high-
value keyword: 25. The list of high-value keywords 
included references to private communications, and 
offline and real-life interactions such as “call,” “email,”  
or “DM” (direct message). These terms were chosen 
on the theory that the most influential members of the 
network would be those who extend their influence 
beyond Twitter. 
•	 following: For Account A following Account B, scores 
were awarded between one and 10 based on the 
average number of tweets per day. For instance, if 
Account B tweeted an average of one or fewer times 
per day, Account B received one point for influence and 
Account A received one point for exposure. If Account 
B tweeted an average of 10 times per day or more, 
the score was capped at 10 in order to avoid unduly 
weighting scores toward users who were simply prolific. 
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We experimented with several different parameters for the 
social network we would measure – influence and exposure 
to the seeds, influence and exposure among followers of 
the seeds, and influence and exposure to followers of the 
followers. Based on manual examination, the second category 
was easily the most interesting and effective. Except where 
explicitly noted, all references to influence and exposure are 
limited by the parameter, interactions only among followers  
of the seeds. 
A quick overview of the measurements produced: 
•	 Influence: A score that measures the ability of one twitter  
user to prompt other Twitter users to redistribute or 
engage with content. 
•	 Influential: A Twitter user who has a high influence score 
and prompts many other users to engage with content. 
•	 Exposure: A score that measures the tendency of one 
Twitter user to engage with or redistribute content 
created by other users. 
•	 Exposed: The measured tendency of a given Twitter user 
to engage with or redistribute content.
•	 Interactivity: The sum of a user’s influence and exposure 
score, reflecting quantity and quality of the user’s overall 
interactions with other users. 
•	 Interactive: The tendency of a user to interact with  
other users.
 
C: Top 10 most influential 
1. Eaglesnest1488
2. MAfreedom
3. GILLY1488
4. MarmiteMan4
5. WARRIOR33_6
6. Aryanliving
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7. Par_Sjogren
8. emilyscreams18
9. johnnywhiter
10. whiteunity14
D: Top 10 most exposed 
1. WARRIOR33_6
2. danielb1714
3. Eaglesnest1488
4. karlhanke32
5. whiteunity14
6. HellWar88
7. DogofWarN
8. xdtac
9. craig25081989
10. viking14ranger
E: Top 20 most interactive 
1. Eaglesnest1488
2. MAfreedom
3. WARRIOR33_6
4. GILLY1488
5. whiteunity14
6. Aryanliving
7. MarmiteMan4
8. johnnywhiter
9. danielb1714
10. WhiteResister
11. KevinGoudreau
12. Par_Sjogren
13. emilyscreams18
14. IvanaWAU
15. HVRabbit
16. DogofWarN
17. B14USA
18. xdtac
19. PaulinaForslund
20. craig25081989
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F: Glossary of Twitter Terms 
Account: An account registered with Twitter. These are 
usually, but not always, managed by a single user. Accounts 
may also be configured automatically tweet content from a 
Web site.  
Handle: The username chosen by a Twitter account holder. 
Tweet: A short message posted on Twitter, limited to 140 
characters in length. Tweets may be simple comments or 
replies to other users, and may include links to content from 
other Web sites. 
Follow: When a Twitter user subscribes to another  
user’s tweets. 
Followers: A list of all users that follower a specific  
Twitter account. 
Followed: A list of all users followed by a specific Twitter 
account, sometimes referred to as “friends.”
Timeline: A user’s view of all tweets posted by the people 
they follow. 
Reply or @reply: When a user directs a comment publicly to 
another user. This is done by placing an “@” sign in front of 
the target user’s handle. 
Direct Message: When two users follow each other, Twitter 
allows them to communicate privately through this service.
Retweet or RT: When a user republishes another user’s 
tweet, with attribution. 
Modified Tweet or MT: A retweet in which the user modifies 
the text of the original tweet. 
Hat-Tip or HT: A tweet that acknowledges another user  
as the source of a link. 
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Non-Reply Mention: Including another user’s handle in a 
tweet that is not a response to a previous tweet by that user. 
This often functions as the equivalent of CCing someone on 
an e-mail message. 
Hashtag: When a Twitter users highlights a term in a tweet 
by placing the “#” sign in front of a word or phrase. Hashtags 
can be used for emphasis but are more often intended to 
make the tweet show up in thematic searches by other users. 
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